Armed Non-state Actors: Their Contribution to
Solving the Landmine Problem
This article presents some findings and lessons learned from a report on armed non-state actor1
involvement in mine action. The report shows that it is possible to engage in humanitarian mine action
with NSAs. The main conclusion is that engaging NSAs in mine action has significant benefits since
their involvement supports the implementation of the main objective of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban
Convention2: to reduce the humanitarian impact of AP mines and unexploded ordnance.
by Anki Sjöberg [ Geneva Call ]

A

rmed non-state actors are currently involved as fighting parties in conflicts all over the world; hence, for a true universalization of the rules and principles of human rights and
international humanitarian law, the involvement of NSAs must be
considered. This is equally true for prohibiting the use of AP mines
because NSAs currently employ these devices. As NSAs are part of
the problem, any solution must include them.
This article presents some of the main findings of a 2006 report,
Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Volume II: A Global
Report of NSA Mine Action,3 which maps and analyzes mine action
by NSAs. The report is the second part of a wider project,4 following
a 2005 report that focused on the negative aspects of the involvement
of NSAs in the landmine problem.5 The 2006 report presents:
• Some general findings concerning involvement by NSAs
in mine action, separated into the five mine-action pillars:
mine-ban advocacy (also including mine-ban policy),6 stockpile destruction, mine clearance, mine-risk education and
victim assistance.
• The findings of an analysis of mine action globally by NSAs—
examining mine action, the advantages, difficulties and lessons learned.
NSA’s Involvement in the Five Mine-action Pillars
The report found practical mine-action examples in the areas of
each of the five mine-action pillars. A total of some 50 groups was
documented as involved in some type of mine action, which was more
than expected. The mine-action activities recorded were not entirely
conducted by non-state actors. They were also performed by indigenous organizations mandated by NSAs or conducted by independent
local or international organizations but facilitated by NSAs.
There are important differences in the numbers of NSAs involved in the different mine-action pillars. The greatest numbers of
NSAs were involved in activities related to the mine-ban policy—35
NSAs have banned AP mines. Of these, 31 had signed Geneva Call’s
Deed of Commitment,7 and at least an additional 14 had allegedly
introduced some type of limitations (temporal or applied) to their
mine use. At least six NSAs, all of them signatories to the Deed of
Commitment, have reportedly been involved in promoting the mine
ban to other non-state actors.
NSAs are rarely involved in stockpile destruction, although this
has occurred in a total of 10 instances. Sometimes NSAs do not de70 | notes from the field | journal of mine action | winter 2006 | 11.1
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stroy stockpiles because they have not yet agreed to a
total ban on AP mines. In some cases, the failure to destroy their stockpiles has also been due to circumstances
beyond their control—a lack of funds or non-cooperation by a concerned state, for example.
Thirty-one NSAs have participated in mine clearance and related activities. In 10 cases, these activities
formed part of a mine-action program. The remainder
participated on a spontaneous or ad hoc basis, involving activities such as clearing camps when leaving them,
clearing mines on the request of the population and
adopting policies to map the mines employed.
Few NSAs have been directly involved in large-scale
MRE programs; four groups were conducting mine-risk
education programs themselves and 12 were facilitating
projects or programs. NSAs engage more frequently in
ad hoc MRE by providing information about mines to
civilians (14 cases documented).

NSAs have reportedly directly provided assistance to civilian victims of landmine accidents (in 20 cases) and have allowed or facilitated outside organizations
to provide victim assistance in areas controlled by the NSAs (15 such cases were
documented).8 While not always reported, it can be assumed that most NSAs generally provide their own combatant victims with assistance to the extent possible.
Assessment of NSAs Involvement in Mine Action and Its Advantages
Generally, NSAs that have banned mines are more likely to be involved in
mine action than groups that have not. Some mine-action practitioners (as well
as Action 46 of the Nairobi Action Plan) 9 suggest that there should be greater
support for mine-action activities when the concerned NSAs have committed to
a mine ban.
There are different reasons why NSAs become involved in mine action.
Recurring themes are humanitarian and development concerns and self-interest. Community pressure is sometimes highlighted as a main factor. An NSA’s
decision to engage in mine action could also be motivated by a combination
of factors.
The primary benefits of mine action by NSAs are considered to be the same
as those arising from other forms of mine action, i.e., principally humanitarian and developmental. Nevertheless, the complementary effects of NSA mine
action (employment and stability; peace-building; security and disarmament;
and openness to discussing other humanitarian norms) are different, and these
are often perceived to be as important as—or even more important than—the
primary benefits of working with NSAs. In addition, the primary benefits for
the population in an area controlled by or influenced by NSAs may be relatively
more significant, given that these areas often greatly lack developmental and
humanitarian activities.
The main factors that appear to make humanitarian mine-action organizations regard involvement by NSAs as necessary, rather than merely desirable, are:
• The group’s military training
• Its possession of information about the mines in the area (and possibly maps)
• Its links to the territory and the population
• The security and cost-effectiveness of working with these actors
Challenges, Tentative Solutions and Lessons Learned
The Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Volume II: A Global Report of
NSA Mine Action3 report showed it is possible to work with NSAs in humanitarian mine action, although various difficulties and challenges involved were identified. The following sections present some of the tentative solutions and lessons
learned it found.
Need to understand and adapt to the political and conflict situation. The
report found the need for flexibility and understanding of the circumstances in
which mine action by NSAs takes place to be particularly important. This openmindedness requires the situation be carefully analyzed in detail, taking into account local knowledge.
Although it has sometimes been argued that a ceasefire, or even a peace agreement, is a necessary condition for comprehensive mine-action operations, it is generally agreed that some mine-action opportunities may present themselves before
the conflict ends. In fact, a step-by-step approach taking certain minimum actions
may not only save lives, but also facilitates larger-scale mine-action activities following the cessation of hostilities.
Flexibility and adaptability are crucial features for security-related problems,
a major concern for mine action involving NSAs. Mine-action organizations
introduce new security procedures and use local guards to overcome such problems. Another possible solution, at least on a temporary basis, has been to work
at a distance by training staff in a safer environment and undertaking other
aspects of mine action that can be performed at a distance (e.g., certain parts
of the survey).
Need for cooperation by the concerned state. One of the main conclusions of
a workshop on mine action in the midst of conflict held in Zagreb, Croatia, in
2005 related to the allocation of legal responsibility for mine action in areas under
control by NSAs. It was found that States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention
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are responsible for mine-action efforts undertaken in the parts of
their territory that, while not under their control, are under their
jurisdiction. Although a State Party can justify its failure to fulfill
its mine-action obligations in the areas of its territory that it does
not control, it is still bound to make “good faith” efforts to fulfill
its Convention obligations.10
Lack of cooperation of the government is an often-cited difficulty faced in mine action by NSAs. Bureaucratic and administrative
barriers have frequently hindered equipment and staff from entering a country. In some cases, the government has completely halted
mine-action activities, but more commonly, the state interferes and
obstructs the work, stopping short of total non-cooperation. It should
be noted, however, that in some cases the concerned states were very
supportive of mine-action activities despite complex situations, and
successful actions were undertaken without difficulties.
Need for capacity-building and training of NSAs. One major
challenge to mine action by NSAs highlighted both by humanitarian
actors and non-state actors is the lack of capacity and equipment. In
many cases, there is a clear need for training and capacity-building
in technical and operational capacity as well as management skills.
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This would be especially necessary if, as has been proposed, NSAs
should assume greater responsibility for facilitating and coordinating
operations. General capacity-building and training have also been
suggested as ways to confront the problems of NSAs’ involvement in
mine action that allegedly stem from the NSAs themselves—namely,
lack of organization, lack of transparency and a predisposition to set
biased priorities.11
In working with NSAs, it is important not only to stigmatize their
use of mines and failure to participate in mine action but also to raise
awareness and educate them about the need for transparency and action. It’s a fine line. Too great an emphasis on stigmatizing NSAs
could have the counterproductive effect of causing them to withdraw
from dialogue about mine action.
Need for financial and priority control. Accusations of corruption arising out of the non-transparency of NSAs (although not numerous) are being taken seriously by international nongovernmental organizations and agencies. Consequently, most international
organizations and NGOs choose to maintain some kind of financial
and/or priority-setting control. In some cases, the problem has been
solved by setting up systems of strict, independent financial control.

Such measures may also avoid unnecessary
tensions between mine-action organizations and NSAs.
Need for increased support. In general,
mine-action practitioners have found thirdparty states and the international community quite supportive of mine-action efforts
involving NSAs, although not sufficiently
so. Third-party actors could make greater
contributions in raising funds and pressuring non-cooperating states. Both the financial and political aspects of support are crucial; however, despite the problems related
to funding for NSA mine action, it has been
argued some governments are only interested in supporting mine-action work with
NSAs largely because of the expected peacebuilding gains. It has also been claimed
that humanitarian actors themselves ought
to make greater efforts to convince governments of the need for mine action and the
humanitarian benefits it brings.
Need for confidence-building, commitment and cooperation. To work in difficult
situations, mine-action practitioners need to
build relationships of trust, not only with
the NSAs, but also with the local communities and authorities. In some cases, a mine
ban on behalf of the NSAs (such as the Deed
of Commitment) would be crucial to ensure
non-state actors’ cooperation with mine-action organizations. Since some NSAs have
begun mine-action activities on their own
before enrolling in international programs,
this may facilitate the commencement of
such programs. Mine-action issues should
also be included (but not exclusively) in exploratory discussions and peace negotiations
between governments and NSAs.
Implementing mixed demining teams
(made up of NSAs and government forces),
aimed at confidence and peace-building, is
likely to require communication among all
parties and leadership by an independent
NGO to facilitate the process.
Need for transparency. One key practice to facilitate mine-action activities in
difficult situations is transparency. By being open and clear about their activities,
humanitarian actors can convince NSAs
and concerned states of their neutrality in
order to avoid security risks and accusations
of “spying.” In return, NSAs and the concerned state(s) also need to be transparent
with humanitarian actors in order to maximize the benefits from mine action since
restrictions on the sharing of information
may cause delays or lead to the cancellation
of operations. Humanitarian actors should
also open with each other in order to solve
common problems with joint solutions.
Finally, the main parties (NSAs and states)

should ideally be as forthcoming as possible
with each other in terms of sharing relevant
information about mined areas and the
progress of mine-action activities.
Need for organization and coordination. When strong NGOs serve as implementing or intermediary agencies, the process works. The donors provide the funding
to the NGO, which works directly with the
NSAs. It requires coordination, information-sharing and open communication
among all the parties.
Need to involve the local communities.
Mine-action practitioners are increasingly
working with local communities, notably in
so-called community-liaison roles.12 NSAs
are sometimes part of these local communities. When NSAs are involved in ad hoc
mine-action activities, it is especially important that mine-action practitioners deal with
them by considering, consulting and including them in the execution of the mine-action
program to avoid tensions between international/national and local efforts. In addition,
involving NSAs in mine action is relevant to
the issue of accountability, since the people
who demine stay in the area afterwards and
would therefore have a vested interest in the
program’s success.
It can be beneficial to include affected
communities in the processes of dialogue
and negotiation with NSAs since their relationship with the NSAs allows the community representatives to put pressure on the
armed actors. However, it can also put the
population at risk. In these cases, it is of the
utmost importance to carefully analyze the
situation and, if necessary, take measures to
protect the communities or to limit their involvement in NSA mine action.
Elements of Analysis
When considering involving NSAs in
mine-action activities, there are some relevant parallels that can be drawn to the
involvement of the regular military in mine
action. As for the regular armed forces, the
political situation and the NSA’s link to the
population determine whether:
• NSAs should be involved in mine action during or after armed conflict
• It is more advantageous to work
with demobilized rather than active
NSA soldiers
• Civilian actors are preferred
Sensitive issues that need to be carefully
considered in different conflict and postconflict situations include:
• Whether the population trusts the
NSAs
• The nature of the relationships between the NSAs and other relevant

armed actors in the area
• The possible outcomes of the actions
Conclusion
In conclusion, Armed Non-State Actors
and Landmines. Volume II: A Global
Report of NSA Mine Action3 shows it is
possible to engage in humanitarian mine
action with NSAs. Given the benefits of
such engagement, it is important not to discriminate against populations in areas under
the control or influence of NSAs, which, as
compared to populations in areas controlled by a state, benefit less frequently from
mine-action programs. The main conclusion of the research is that engaging NSAs
in mine action has significant benefits, since
their involvement supports efforts to reduce
the humanitarian impact of landmines and
unexploded ordnance.
See Endnotes, Page
This article is drawn from a report produced by Geneva Call, Armed Non-State
Actors and Landmines. Volume II: A Global
Report of NSA Mine Action,3 which was published in November 2006. The report can be
downloaded from Geneva Call’s Web site at
http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm. Hard
copies can be obtained by writing to info@genevacall.org.
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